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Abstract  
Shared understanding between diverse technology stakeholders is a key driver of IT-Business align-
ment, also underpinning successful adaptive, IS development activities.  Lack of shared understanding 
creates representational gaps, innovation blindness and different technology frames which create bar-
riers to development and implementation of technology.  Applying a socio-material perspective to 
Leonard-Barton’s model of mutual adaptation between technology and organization, as well as re-
search on shared capabilities between IS and business stakeholders, we examine the process by which 
shared understanding emerges during the design, development and implementation of IT systems.  We 
followed key multi-disciplinary stakeholder groups over a two-year period during the development 
and implementation of a health information system.  We report on events during the project that we 
call ruptures – highly charged incidents which reveal a lack shared understanding between stakehold-
ers.  We argue that ruptures occur during the mutual adaptation of organizational and technological 
elements necessitated by the implementation process and are precipitated by the constitutive entan-
glement of social and technological elements. They reveal serious misalignments among stakeholders 
and in relation to the technology as its material properties become more concrete.  We investigate the 
emergence of ruptures and the mechanisms by which they influence stakeholders, the implementation 
process and its outcomes. 
Keywords: Mutual Adaptation, Shared Cognition, Socio-materiality, IS Development & Implementa-
tion 
 
1 Introduction 
This study investigates the evolution of shared understanding among multi-disciplinary stakeholders 
engaged in a transformational IT-enabled organizational change effort.  The presence of shared under-
standing between diverse stakeholders of a technology is a key driver of Business-IT alignment and it 
is seen as underpinning successful adaptive, IS development activities.  A lack of shared understand-
ing contributes to representational gaps (Cronin & Weingart, 2007), innovation blindness (Leonardi, 
2011) and different technology frames (Wanda J. Orlikowski & Gash, 1994) which create barriers to 
the successful and effective development and implementation of technology.  
While prior research has considered the need for and value of shared understanding amongst stake-
holders during the design, development and implementation of IT, we lack insight into how such 
shared understanding emerges and evolves.  This became our research objective.  To shed light on the 
evolution of shared understanding during implementation, we turned to Leonard-Barton’s model of 
mutual adaptation between technology and organization (Leonard-Barton, 1988).   Applying a socio-
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material perspective to this model (Leonardi & Barley, 2008), and incorporating the research on 
shared knowledge between business and IS stakeholders as drivers of IT value, we examine the pro-
cess by which shared understanding emerges via mutual adaptation during the design, development 
and implementation of IT systems within a healthcare setting.   
Below we outline the literature which informed our research.  The role of shared understanding in 
alignment and value creation enabled us to situate the significance of our research question.  Subse-
quently, we narrowed our focus to the information systems development (ISD) stage of implementa-
tion seeking insights from research on adaptive IS practices as well as the learning processes for 
stakeholders during ISD.   Leonard-Barton’s model of mutual adaptation served to inspire our theoret-
ical development.  However, in order to focus the model to support the investigation of shared under-
standing we integrated a socio-material lens to focus on the constitutively entangled elements 
(Orlikowski, 2007): the stakeholders (social) and the material properties of the technology which are 
implicated in this phenomenon. 
Our methods were qualitative and grounded in interpreting multiple data sources from a longitudinal 
field study of the implementation of a transformational IT in a healthcare setting.  In this study, we 
report on the design and development phase and our observation and interpretation of events that we 
call ruptures — highly charged incidents which spotlight the revelation of a lack shared understanding 
between stakeholders.  We investigate the emergence of ruptures and the mechanisms by which rup-
tures precipitate recursive cycles of mutual adaptation that influence stakeholders, the implementation 
process and its outcomes. 
2 Literature Review  
Organizations spend enormous sums on IT (Iivari & Huisman, 2007), more than on all other forms of 
capital combined (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012). Historical success rates for IT projects are 
poor, but improving (Sauer, Gemino, & Reich, 2007).  Yet firms struggle to realize value from their IT 
investments. A variety of reasons for this inability to realize business value from IT investments have 
been investigated including IT project management practices (Kirsch, 2000); firm level factors 
(Melville, Kraemer, & Gurbaxani, 2004; Piccoli & Ives, 2005) and business-IT alignment (Reich & 
Benbasat, 2000).  Firms with effective IT governance earn up to 40% higher returns (Weill & Ross, 
2004) which is achieved through mechanisms which promote the alignment of business and IT.  Oth-
ers have established that greater strategic alignment enhances firm performance (Y E Chan, Huff, 
Barclay, & Copeland, 1997; Sabherwal & Chan, 2001).  Alignment is the process of matching the 
goals, objectives and strategies of the IT department with those of the firm (Campbell & Kay, 2005; 
Yolande E. Chan, 2002; Henderson & Venkatraman, 1996; Reich & Benbasat, 2000).  Shared under-
standing amongst key stakeholders is critical to successful alignment practices and outcomes and it has 
been examined in multiple ways.  When business and IT people have a common understanding of the 
other’s technical knowledge (shared domain knowledge), they engage in more effective communica-
tion, create a more trusting relationship and ultimately realize greater value from investments 
(Campbell & Kay, 2005; Reich & Benbasat, 2000).  Examining shared understanding as competen-
cies, we know that business professionals need knowledge of technology, applications, systems devel-
opment, and IT management, as well as knowledge about who to ask whereas  IT professionals need 
to have knowledge of the organization and its processes, leadership, networking and communications 
skills (resulting in a higher intention to develop a partnership) (Bassellier, Benbasat, & Reich, 2003).   
Reich & Benbasat (2000) looked at the current practices (in addition to shared domain knowledge) 
that support alignment, including regular communication and connections between IT and business 
planning.   
While a competency-based perspective sheds light on the observation that shared knowledge and un-
derstanding is an important factor – it does not provide us with insight into how shared knowledge 
develops.  While it may represent an ‘overlap’ in knowledge we believe a more dynamic orientation 
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must be considered.  If alignment is to be achieved, some level of knowledge sharing must occur in 
order to achieve shared knowledge.  Since alignment is at least partly manifest in the way in which 
new IT is brought to bear on achieving firm strategy, we examined the literature on systems develop-
ment and implementation for insight. 
The information systems development (ISD) literature has sought to understand the practice of sys-
tems development within implementation research, the factors influencing ISD success and failure and 
provided numerous prescriptive practices to achieve success (Galliers & Swan, 2000; Lyytinen & 
Robey, 1999).  Branches of ISD research have also investigated the success of iterative, adaptive 
methods over more traditional planned methods (Abrahamsson, Conboy, & Wang, 2009) the need for 
‘cultivation’ approaches (Ciborra & Hanseth, 1998) over adhering to a pre-programmed plan and the 
recognition of implementation as a continuation of the innovation process – requiring mutual adapta-
tion during implementation because ‘technology almost never fits perfectly into the user environment’ 
(Leonard-Barton, 1988, p.252).  These latter approaches embed notion of learning as a critical task 
with ISD (Lyytinen & Robey, 1999; Robey, Ross, & Boudreau, 2002).  They situate requirements 
analysis as a socially constructed task of discovering emergent requirements over time (Holmström & 
Sawyer, 2010) and accept pluralism and subjectivity as underpinning (Galliers & Swan, 2000), raising 
the implication that negotiating these emergent, subject and pluralistic needs amongst groups stake-
holders is a crucial factor in ISD success.  Thus it seems that social learning – i.e. shared knowledge 
and knowledge sharing must be processes in play during ISD.  
But our review of this literature again suggests that while much effort has been put into understanding 
the socially constructed and learning dimensions of effective ISD efforts, findings have emphasized 
developers’ needs and understandings over that of business stakeholders (Holmström & Sawyer, 2010) 
or accounted for knowledge deficiencies at a high level of aggregation such as configuration or assimi-
lation knowledge barriers (Robey et al., 2002). Therefore, in studying the emergence and evolution of 
shared understanding for ISD, we sought a theoretical logic that would enable us to account for the 
emergent, subjective and pluralistic realities of the ISD process.  
3 Theoretical Approach 
Dorothy Leonard Barton’s account of mutual adaptation during the implementation process of tech-
nology provides a strong theoretical basis for viewing the learning process and emergent nature of ISD 
(Leonard-Barton, 1988, p. 251).  Reproduced here as Figure 1, it draws attention to both the user envi-
ronment and the technology and the need for the mutual adaptation of one or both as new technology 
is implemented in an organization. Her 
work suggests a need to explore cycles of 
adaptation and presents cycles as both 
small and large – varying on the degree to 
which time and resources are required to 
bring misalignments into alignment.  Both 
types of misalignments are explained and 
small and large technology cycles of adap-
tation, and organizational cycles of adapta-
tion (based on performance criteria or de-
livery systems) are explored.   
However helpful this conception is, it was 
incomplete for our needs on two fronts.  
First, even as it accounts for mutual adap-
tation as the simultaneous adaptation of 
technology and organization together, it 
still holds these two facets of the phenom-
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enon as discrete or ontologically separate.  Thus it fails to account for more recent socio-material per-
spectives on technology in organizations which emphasizes the constitutive entanglement orientation 
towards the social and the material (Leonardi & Barley, 2008, 2010; W. J. Orlikowski, 2007).  
Second, although it is intended to situate itself at multiple levels of an organization’s mutual adapta-
tion experience, it fails to explicate how shared understanding amongst stakeholders (within them-
selves, between each other) and about the material properties of the technology (as it moves from ab-
stract to concrete artifact) emerges through social interactions and material interactions with the tech-
nology (Leonardi, 2011). 
For theoretical insight on socio-materiality in IT implementation, we turned to the works of Wanda 
Orlikowski, Paul Leonardi and Stephen Barley. In order to take socio-materiality seriously as a theo-
retical lens we need to embrace constitutive entanglement of the social and the material. This requires 
re-thinking the separation of technology and the user environment depicted in Figure 1 above and in-
stead conceiving of cycles of adaptation as occurring through a single, recursive cycle of human-
material entanglements (Orlikowski, 2007) or the mangle of practice (Pickering, 1995).       
Leonardi and Barley’s work on technology and organizational change deploys socio-material theoreti-
cal techniques which help shed light on how social interactions shape peoples interpretation of tech-
nology, how they use them and how that use will either promote or stymie organizational change. He 
finds it is possible to understand why the organizational change failed by accounting for how the par-
ticipants constructed information about the technology through both their social and material interac-
tions with it (Leonardi & Barley, 2008).  Given this insight, we determined that our research strategy 
to study the emergence of shared understanding would need to provide us with a longitudinal view that 
captured the emergent nature of the social interactions of stakeholders and their socio-material interac-
tions with the technology artefact being developed.  We described our approach next. 
4 Research Methodology 
In order to investigate the evolution of shared understanding, a longitudinal field study was required.  
We needed a longitudinal study to be able to see the evolution as it unfolded, rather than relying on 
retrospective accounts, which are known to be unreliable (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The depth of an 
intensive field study was necessary because the nature of shared understanding (how it is measured, 
what might influence it) is unknown.  So a degree of emergence in the research was important. A case 
study was conducted using a variety of data sources. 
4.1 Research Context 
We studied a project called the Clinical Transformation Project (CTP1).CTP involved the implemen-
tation of new capabilities within the organization’s EMR system, which was purchased from a leading 
vendor (hereafter referred to as the vendor).  Four specific capabilities were being introduced: com-
puterized provider order entry (CPOE), electronic medication reconciliation (e-Med Rec), electronic 
Medication Administration Record (eMAR) and closed loop medication administration (CLMA). 
These capabilities would radically change the work of most clinical staff at the hospitals. For example 
physicians would be required to enter medication, lab and diagnostic imaging orders directly into the 
computer system rather than writing them on paper and having the data entry done by non-regulated 
(i.e., clerical) personnel.  The process by which nurses administered medications would also change, 
requiring a workstation on wheels (WOW) to transport medications and record their administration, 
and scanning of barcodes on the medication and the patient’s wristband before each drug administra-
                                                     
1 A pseudonym.  
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tion.  Because of the level of intended workflow change, and because the objectives of the project 
were related to improving quality of care, the project was officially positioned as a clinical transfor-
mation activity rather than an IT project.   
Ten Canadian hospital organizations were involved in the project: 3 large teaching hospitals in an ur-
ban area and 7 regional hospitals spread throughout the surrounding community.  The teaching hospi-
tals reflected the typical referral sites for the regional hospitals. The EMR vendor was engaged as an 
implementation consultant, providing services related to system configuration and building as well as 
some assistance in project and change management. 
The structure of the project was somewhat unique in that the hospital IT was managed through a 
shared service organization housed at one of the teaching hospitals (Hospital X).  This shared services 
organization housed the project team for all 10 hospitals. 
The project was first conceived in 2009, when a new CEO at one of the teaching hospitals (Hospital 
Y) promoted the changes based on experiences in a prior hospital.  It was originally planned to be ini-
tiated in 2010 and completed in 2016 but was ultimately advanced due to its alignment with various 
other organizational initiatives and the availability of funding to support it.  The project charter was 
formally approved in 2011, with implementations phased across the 10 hospitals from late 2013 to 
mid-2014. The project followed a largely sequential, structured design methodology based on the ven-
dor’s recommendation.  Workflow sessions were conducted early on with potential users to both un-
derstand requirements and map the degree of change required.  A design review was conducted early 
in the process to explain the system logic to the users.  Following the workflow sessions and design 
review, a design team, composed of hospital and vendor personnel worked to configure the vendor 
software for the organization.  Implementation was conducted in phases, with different hospitals going 
live over an eight month period. 
4.2 Data Collection 
The primary data for this project come from participant observation.  We were able to attend meetings 
of the project steering committee and the joint advisory committee (including clinicians and physi-
cians). Each of these groups met monthly, and our observation ran from November 2012 to the present 
time.  During these meetings each member of the research team took separate notes creating 52 indi-
vidual detailed documents of observations.  We also observed two hospital-wide events involving 
hundreds of participants: a design review when the vendor presented the system functionality (No-
vember 2012) and a pre-implementation briefing day (in September 2013). One of us was also on site 
at many of the hospitals during the first few days after they went live.  During these visits we observed 
the activities of project team members in the command centre.  We were not able to observe out on the 
hospital floors due to the additional ethics requirements associated with having access to patients and 
patient data.  However, discussions in the command centre focused directly on the experiences of us-
ers out on the floors and so we feel that we got at least a reasonable sense of how things were pro-
gressing.  We also were able to do some informal observation during our lunch breaks, when we were 
in the hospital cafeterias. 
In addition to participant observation, we were able to conduct 1 hour interviews with sixteen mem-
bers of the joint advisory committee and steering committees, including the project sponsor, the execu-
tive sponsor, and the vendor’s engagement manager.  These interviews allowed us to probe further on 
the observations we were making, and learn more about the experiences of participants in the process. 
We had regular informal conversations with participants on the two committees we observed through-
out the project. We also had access to hundreds of project documents, including the project charter, 
budgets, meeting minutes, the close-out report from the project sponsor, and a series of post-
implementation reviews conducted by various internal and external parties. Finally, about 5 months 
after the final hospital go-live, as part of the project close-out activities we conducted an open-ended 
survey of 122 people who were involved in the project (from team leads, to the executive sponsor) 
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asking each person to identify the key lessons learned from the project in terms of governance, project 
management, benefits realization, stewardship of resources, communication, training and support,  
4.3 Data Analysis & Findings 
We used a subset of data for this research – specifically the data associated with the design and devel-
opment activities and their impact; this was principally the observation data and interviews.  As there 
were 10 organizations and each launched the system at separate times over an 8 month period design 
and development activities actually continued for later organizations, even though earlier organiza-
tions had launched the system.  
Data analysis for this project is proceeding in an iterative fashion.  When attending meetings, we both 
kept detailed field notes, recording the important conversations.  We paid particular attention to parts 
of the discussion that pertained to the participants’ understandings of the CTP, and of the technology 
that was central to achieving the organizational goals. We usually met following the meetings to dis-
cuss our different perspectives on what we had observed, and then reviewed and perhaps amended our 
notes based on the conversation.  Our field notes and interviews were transcribed and entered into an 
NVivo database, along with all of the project documents we have obtained.   
Coding of the NVivo data is being done by both authors as well as a research assistant, looking for 
common themes related to the development of shared understanding.  In our earliest observations, we 
were able to observe instances where participants did not share a common understanding of the pro-
ject.  For example, we had been told in numerous discussions with the project sponsor and the VP of 
IT, that the naming of the project was critical in order to convey it as a clinical rather than IT project.  
So, the CTP name was meant to refer to the organizational change (including the technology) rather 
than to the system per se. But in the first steering committee meeting that we attended, we observed 
several instances of people referring to the system as CTP and then being corrected by others.  Devel-
oping this shared language to ensure that the meaning of CTP was preserved to be the organizational 
change was a critical consideration.  Over time, we observed less vigilance about correcting mis-uses 
of the term.  Yet the idea of CTP as a clinical transformation rather than an IT implementation was 
maintained within this group. Other instances related to shared understanding also began to emerge 
from the data, and these are the focus of our findings. We call these instances “ruptures”.  Ruptures are 
points where the smooth progress of the project gets interrupted by an unexpected event or issue.  
They reflect the disagreements among stakeholders, but they are not the disagreements per se.  Rather 
they are the points at which the disagreement becomes “visible” to the group. 
We begin by describing 3 of these ruptures, and then we turn to our interpretation of them, using 
Leonard-Barton’s (1998) notion of cycles of adaptation. 
4.3.1 Diagnostic Imaging Order Form 
We first saw this electronic form (e-form) presented at a joint advisory committee meeting (JAC) in 
April of 2013.  It was presented as a way to speed data entry for outpatients who would be visiting 
diagnostic radiology and nuclear medicine. It was a 5-6 question, yes / no form. Our first reaction 
(written in our field notes) was that there were some fairly nice elements to the e-form, in particular 
the ability to carry forward information from the patient’s history (e.g., if they had a clip or other im-
plant). 
The provider reaction was less positive. The main question was why providers would need to enter the 
information at all, since (a) this used to be done by nurses or clerks, and (b) radiology would re-check 
the information when the patient came for their visit (since patients could be harmed by an error in the 
information).  The track lead for this area explained that it related to the scheduling of imaging ap-
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pointments, for example, needing to know creatinine levels for scheduling certain tests for patients 
with kidney dysfunction. The diagnostic imaging providers said “it will cripple them”2 if this infor-
mation is not captured each time when an appointment is requested.  This was confirmed in an inter-
view a few months later with a radiologist. 
The discussion continued, with a degree of contention about who was right.  One participant asked 
whether physicians who would be ordering tests had been consulted in the development (radiologists 
rarely place orders; they only receive them).  Providers challenged why this had to be entered every 
time.  One answer to the latter question is that the organization had chosen to implement CPOE but 
not CLINDOC.  So the data for diabetic patients or those with hypertension would not be documented 
electronically and therefore couldn’t be pulled into the order form from the chart. 
Little was resolved in the discussion, although there was a plan to review it again and perhaps try to 
find some way to pull the data from somewhere to make it available so it didn’t have to be entered 
each time.  The discussion concluded with the meeting chair (a former nurse who was now acting as 
provider track lead) saying: “Let’s kill this (i.e., move) before it kills us”. 
The issue came back again in the next meeting, a month later.  It was clear that the providers hated the 
form (this is exactly what one of us wrote in her field notes) and felt that radiology was being “unrea-
sonable”.  They had had a meeting and seemed to make some progress, but then radiology pushed 
back again saying they had to have the information to meet their professional standards (and protect 
their license).  This was corroborated in our interview with a radiologist who argued that the issue was 
about doctors trying to avoid their proper accountability.  According to the radiologist they are sup-
posed to complete the requisition in full (and the information requested has not changed).  But in the   
paper world, they might well have signed blank requisitions and then had them completed by a nurse 
or a clerk or a medical secretary. This violates college of physician guidelines but is a common worka-
round.  The Clinical Transformation Project, specifically the component related to CPOE, would not 
allow this to continue. 
The issues raised by the providers related to (a) whether the data being requested was relevant (i.e., do 
I have this information when I’m ordering the test?) and (b) the fact that inpatient DI orders were now 
being handled the same way as ambulatory orders – and this seems to be part of where the increased 
stringency is coming from. 
The discussion/debate continued until the provider track lead intervened:  “we are circling the point”.  
At this point, the chair sought one person from radiology and one from physicians to make a decision 
for what will happen at the start.  The physicians were then encouraged to “try it for a few months and 
see how it works” and then adapt the process further. 
Our field notes record a pattern of radiologists trying to “sell” the providers on trying it out.  The pro-
viders were questioning whether radiologists would ever be willing to change, and the team was say-
ing they will, even though the recent meetings suggest that they won’t at all!  They were also trying to 
work on some technical solutions (can they flow through some information from the electronic chart 
without full CLINDOC) but they did not have that issue settled. 
Eventually the project sponsor suggested that it can be taken to steering. The provider track lead sug-
gested sending it to the executive sponsor and the Medical Advisory Council.  These moves appeared 
to be intended as threats (appealing to a higher authority), and this sort of escalation (debate, debate, 
threaten…) was a recurring pattern across other instances.  
When the issue came back 2 months later (July 2013) a bypass option had been added to the form, 
specifically to accommodate emergency/trauma situations where the information could not be ac-
                                                     
2 Quotes are taken from our field notes unless specifically noted. 
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quired.  There was a discussion about auditing the bypass use to make sure providers were not abusing 
the system to avoid doing things they were supposed to. 
4.3.2 Instantmessage 
This issue relates to a way in which messages are shared within the EMR system.  There is a message 
centre built into the system where workflow elements are directed (e.g., orders for approval when cre-
ated by someone other than the provider, test results to be reviewed, etc.).  But as an email-like sys-
tem, it depends on the provider going into their inbox, finding a request, and acting on it.   
A second tool, which we’ll refer to as instantmessage, was explained at a meeting in September 2013. 
When it was raised in the meeting, several of the providers were opposed.  They explained their con-
cerns as related to a couple of issues.  The way that the functionality worked is similar to popular IM 
tools. Communications would be sent around between various members of a care team in real time.  
Any actor in the group could add another party to the communication if they felt they needed to be 
involved.  At any point in the discussion, any participant could save the message chain to the chart. 
This ability to save is an important feature as it allows a set of care-related messages to be preserved, 
but it was also the point of contention.  The providers were concerned that they could be copied with-
out their consent into a conversation, then have it saved and as a result have medical-legal liability for 
what was discussed in the conversation.  With an open IM-type conversation, it was also possible for 
discussions to involve multiple patients (we need to do X for Mrs Jones and Y for Mr. Patel).  And 
then this could get saved to one of the patients’ charts thus violating the other’s privacy. 
The first time the issue was raised (September 2013) there was a great deal of confusion.  The distinc-
tion between message centre (email) and the instantmessage functionality (IM) was not very clear, and 
the way that the EMR systems’ messaging tools would relate to the hospital’s email system (Group-
wise) was also ambiguous.  So the decision was made to go and get more information. 
In November of 2013, the issue came back to the committee. The providers were adamant that it 
should not be turned on for the reasons stated.  To this, they added explanations that the vendor’s 
guidelines are that instantmessage should not be used for inpatient activities or for urgent activities, 
and that all users should be aware of the medical-legal implications of the ability of any participant to 
save the information to the chart.  They also argued that there were other ways to get real-time com-
munication such as calling or talking face to face, so their conclusion was that there was no reason for 
it, and therefore it should not be done. 
Despite the vendor recommendations and the providers’’ determined arguments, there was continued 
pressure to try it.  As one of the project team members explained to the group, the providers in one of 
the hospital’s ambulatory (out-patient) clinics used it and found it very helpful. The project team 
member, who worked closely with the ambulatory clinics in general also felt that it was worth consid-
ering because (s)he could envision some areas where it would be helpful.  Moreover, experience in 
outpatient EMRs (e.g., family practice clinics etc.) had shown this type of functionality to be extreme-
ly useful.  Two providers continued to strenuously oppose it as “the antithesis of the 80/20 rule”.  The 
discussion concluded with a unanimous recommendation from PAC/CAC to turn it off.  
And yet, a month later the issue came back.  The lead physician in the ambulatory clinic that used the 
functionality was clearly advocating for it.  He viewed it as “the best functionality in the system”. The 
team challenged the previously stated view that the vendor did not recommend it.  The vendor does 
recommend it for outpatient but not inpatient settings.   
This discussion led to another point of learning about the structure of the technical artifact, and anoth-
er missing piece of the puzzle.  Functionality like this is turned on or off at the role level. In the pre-
CTP version of the system (which had been in place for more than 10 years) they had “a bazillion po-
sitions including like 47 different types of NURSE” (provider interview). Part of the development 
work was trying to reduce the number of unique positions because they added maintenance complexity 
to the system. For example, if you wanted to add a function for a nurse and there were 47 different 
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kinds of nurse, you had to add it 47 times.  The organizations had decided to reduce physicians to a 
single position, whether ambulatory or inpatient, because there is some crossover (physicians who 
work in both ambulatory and inpatient care) which would require dual logins.  So the choice was ei-
ther on for everyone or off for everyone.  One provider noted that individual physicians could turn it 
off, but viewed this as risky if you have incomplete conversations because a provider is not using it. 
At the conclusion of the December meeting, the CTP team indicated that they would continue to in-
vestigate and bring it back again.  Our field notes questioned the size and power of the group that was 
advocating for it because it was fairly clear that the committee members (or at least the most vocal 
ones) were very opposed yet the issue kept returning. In this meeting, two of the providers who’d been 
actively engaged in the discussions finally devolved into somewhat juvenile antics – joking, sarcasm 
and silly behavior.   The issue, as recorded in our field notes, was that their rational arguments were 
being ignored over the arguments of largely one person who liked it.   
Two months later, the next time our notes report it was discussed, the message was “it is off and will 
stay off until after go live. At some future point we will reassess”. 
4.3.3 Emergency Department Module 
This issue was probably the most extreme rupture we saw.  We’d heard lots of “issues” with the emer-
gency department (ED) module throughout the development, beginning with a lot of concern from 
physicians that the system wouldn’t support their needs. A lot of this was likely pushback against the 
concept of physicians having to directly place their own orders within the context of a busy ED (a 9 
hour wait time at one of the hospitals).  But throughout the discussions it came across as more of a 
case of “doctor resistance”. 
Then in August of 2013, a little over 2 months before the first go live when the second round of inte-
gration testing was taking place, a very large problem was uncovered.  We first heard about it in a 
steering committee meeting (which was also the first time that many members of the committee were 
hearing about it).   
What they had discovered was that the ED module in use had been heavily customized to meet the 
needs of the ED in the days when it didn’t have to integrate with other modules in the EMR system.  
The customizations meant they were not using the vendor’s standard coding, which compromised their 
ability to create new functionality that they now needed (e.g., a report on patients who left without 
being seen or who left with tests completed but not reported) as these create a medical legal obligation.  
The vendor’s developers would tell them something could be done, but then their internal IT people 
would tell them it couldn’t because “they weren’t using that field that way”.   
We learned in an interview with physician, that this had come to a head in integration testing when 
they ported over the current application to the new EMR domain.  “Basically they were trying to push 
existing data into the new database structure and it “blew up”.  It was garbage data” (physician inter-
view).   
At the steering committee meeting (Aug 18) the project sponsor reported the problem and the tentative 
hope that there was now a solution in place.  As of the previous Friday they thought they had solved it 
but they were still testing.  If the problem wasn’t solved, however, there was a real risk of having to 
delay the first go live. So the project was moved to RED status (it had been in yellow since January).  
They discussed when to tell the physicians but decided to wait until they were sure what would happen 
to avoid creating impression the go live might be missed. 
This issue was later referred to as “The ED Module Debacle” and the tiger team that got together was 
referred to as “ED Module Jail”. This was a name given by someone on the build team because they 
were put into a special room with about 16 computers and various builders, users, testers all working 
on finding solutions.  They were pulled off of any other duties and they had daily update calls to ex-
plain what was happening. 
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5 Discussion 
The evolution of the project can be viewed from the perspective of the entanglements between materi-
al properties of technology and social interaction between participants in the project as they move 
through time.  Our socio-material model of mutual adaptation (derived from Leonard Barton, 1988) is 
depicted in Figure 2. We attempt to depict what is actually a dynamic, rotating, 3 dimensional concep-
tion in a 2 dimensional space. Over time, as the technology and its material properties move from ab-
stract conceptualizations, instantiated in the minds of individuals and in documents, slides, design 
tools etc. towards more concrete technology features that can be seen and experienced, there are con-
current and mutually constitutive social activities occurring (imagine the funnel spinning – in motion).  
These occur between project participants (i.e. meetings, formal communications etc.) and can be 
viewed as opportunities to create a common understanding of what the technology is ‘supposed to do’ 
and how users will use it to do their jobs.  As the technology is ‘configured’ and tested, and as stake-
holders are trained the knowable features emerge and challenge socially constructed ‘knowledge’ of 
what the system will do. The actual capabilities come into relation with the ‘ought to be’ located in the 
minds of the stakeholders.  Efforts to create shared understanding become visible as misalignments (in 
Leonard-Barton’s model).  We call these socio-cognitive-material events ruptures. A rupture is a phe-
nomenon of realizing a degree of misalignment between users in relation to the developing technology 
or between what users want and what technology can do.  We discuss our interpretation of the ruptures 
outlined above next. 
The diagnostic orders e-form issue occurred early in the design phase when new workflow between 
groups was being analyzed and instantiated in the system.  The conflict emerged between the ordering 
physicians and the DI group as each has interpreted the way things ‘should’ work in the new system 
differently.  The DI group saw the system as an opportunity to reinforce “proper” procedures in the 
new system.  But the ordering physicians saw the request as creating issues for their ability to com-
plete the forms with relevant information.  By defining the issue as “providers trying to not do their 
jobs” the radiology people were not open to hearing the specific issues that providers were raising.  
They ranged from trying to sell them on “try it out” to wanting to just force them.  In our interview 
with the radiologist, (s)he said “it’s fine if you don’t want to complete the form…we just won’t do the 
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test” because it is not safe.  This redefinition of the problem around “safety” was another recurring 
theme.  And yet, when asked what happens if the information is not provided (or is incorrect) the im-
plication was not that the patient is exposed to risk but rather than a test might be delayed while the 
information was correctly verified.  So the bigger problem seems to be efficiency, not safety.   
Recall that the broad objective with the CTP project was clinical transformation. Within the context of 
our socio-material interpretation, the pre-CTP world allowed the ‘mangle of practice (Pickering, 1995) 
to unfold in particular ways that shielded providing doctors with having to do all of the work required 
to order DI’s since paper forms could be handed over to others for completion.  As the new system 
was being designed, the new workflow (which requires online ordering by physician themselves) 
made old practices visible (to radiologists) and equally created new understanding of the additional 
work that ordering physicians would be required to undertake. Concurrently it empowered the radiolo-
gy group to ‘enforce’ in the material properties of the system, practices they believed were safer and 
more efficient but which were much less efficient for the ordering doctors.  It is therefore not surpris-
ing that the two groups would need to at some point, come to terms with the new inter-departmental 
social order as implemented in the new systems.  Thus the rupture that emerged created the opportuni-
ty for understandings to be revealed, discussed and new understandings to be created and absorbed.  
The instantmessage issue has many similarities to the DI e-form issue.  It involves different stakehold-
er viewpoints (in this case a subset of the ambulatory clinic physicians – largely one team) and the 
other physicians at the joint advisory meetings.  Instantmessage is a material property of the technolo-
gy, entangled with workflow and the social interactions between clinicians during patient care. The 
one physician who was in opposition, while a member of the committee, was rarely in attendance so 
his viewpoint was almost always explained by others.  This second-hand filtering of information was a 
real barrier to shared understanding because he never had to confront his peers’ arguments.  Resolu-
tion of the problem was also hindered by a lack of clear understanding of the technology and the inter-
actions between various foundational technical decisions (in this case the number of positions) and the 
ability to resolve different stakeholders’ views/needs/positions. In effect, the tasks of different physi-
cian roles (ambulatory vs. inpatient) demanded different communication flows instantiated within the 
technology but the technology was limited by being only capable of facilitating a single communica-
tion flow for the single ‘role’ of physician. The socio-material entanglement was at the level of the 
physician role at the expense of the workflow needs.  Therefore, material inflexibility collided with 
socially constructed practices.  In the activity of transforming clinical practice, this rupture exposed a 
lack of understanding with respect to the limitations of the system to support distinct physician needs 
by task.  Since the team couldn’t invoke safety concerns, resolution was harder to reach. 
The ED module rupture came from the gap in understanding how existing customizations of the tool 
(pre-CTP) had changed the structure within the tool in ways that would not be consistent with the 
post-CTP version.  Prior decisions about the socio-material entanglements of the workflow and system 
emerged as a major constraint to clinical transformation.   Here there was not a gap between user 
groups with different needs, or between users and developers, but rather there was a gap between the 
in-house developers who had customized the system and the vendor developers who were trying to do 
things in the standard way.  ED physician workflow was caught in the crossfire. The physician we in-
terviewed expressed the view that “I just assumed that someone knew all of this, that someone would 
have had the information and known what to ask”, but the vendor developers would have had no rea-
son to know of the existing customizations (they perhaps should have known to ask) and the in-house 
developers were not being tasked with the new build because they did not have experience with CPOE 
– therefore they lacked the vendor’s knowledge to foresee this problem.    
In this case, the rupture did not evolve/unfold with the slowly increasing tension and entrenching of 
arguments followed by the appeal to patient safety.  But like the others, it became clear in the interac-
tions with the material artifact (at testing here vs. when confronted with the input form for the DI order 
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e-form). And it certainly produced a highly charged emotional reaction, followed by a realization of 
what was “unknown” and needed to be learned. 
What we observed consistently across ruptures then was that understanding the event required under-
standing the ‘mangle’ (Pickering, 1995) of three things.  First, the material properties of the technolo-
gy need to be understood (as the technology design and development moves the tool from abstract to 
concrete).  Second, the materiality of the workflow (as it is redesigned to take advantage of the new 
technology) plays a role in interpreting ruptures.  Finally we saw at work the efforts by the observed 
teams to understand the first two issues in combination with the constitution/reconstitution of the so-
cial interactions and practices enacted by clinicians and physicians.  We concluded that ruptures are 
not misalignments nor are they disagreements, rather they are socio-cognitive events which are wres-
tling with the socio-material nature of organizational life and they are necessary in the development or 
shared understanding between stakeholders.  In Leonard Barton’s model of mutual adaptation, misa-
lignments between organization and technology are resolved through recursive adaptive cycles. A cy-
cle of technology understanding implies revisiting the technology vendor, code, modules and the like.  
A cycle of organizational adaptation might include reformulating the project management process or 
changing workflow.   
The ruptures in our model are also recursive cycles but they involve a more complex interplay be-
tween technology and organization (the mangle of practice) overlaid with recursive cycles of under-
standing concomitant with an emerging materiality in the technology artefact.  Ruptures are character-
ized by tension, emotion, debate and a rupture may or may not be easily ‘resolved’.  Rather, as depict-
ed in Figure 2, within the socio-cognitive-material model we have proposed from our data, ruptures 
can ebb away either towards resolution within the mangle (as shared understanding and knowledge) or 
rotate around back to tension, emotion and debate.  It may take repeated cycles of efforts to achieve 
shared understanding before a rupture abates. 
6 Conclusions 
In this research, we developed a model of the evolution of shared understanding among multi-
disciplinary stakeholders engaged in a transformational IT-enabled organizational change effort.  The 
presence of shared understanding between diverse stakeholders of a technology is a key driver of 
business-IT alignment and it is seen as underpinning successful adaptive, IS development activities.  
While prior research has considered the need for and value of shared understanding amongst stake-
holders during the design, development and implementation of IT, we lack insight into how such 
shared understanding evolves and emerges during this timeframe.  Our study proposes a model for 
understanding the evolution of shared understanding as a phenomenon that unfolds overtime, within 
the context of negotiating the constitutive entanglement of the social and the material.   
Our principal contribution is in taking Leonard Barton’s model of mutual adaptation (Leonard Barton, 
1988) and adding a socio-materiality perspective (Leonardi & Barley, 2008). With this, we examine 
the phenomenon of systems design and development activities that produce shared understanding as a 
valuable alignment mechanism.  We identify ruptures as detectable and important phenomena that 
contribute to the difficult work of evolving a shared understanding amongst diverse stakeholders.  
Even as they take stakeholders (including users and designers) backwards to original systems goals 
and visions, they also help the project/stakeholders make progress towards effective design and devel-
opment decisions for the new technology.  Ruptures thus emerge as a critical event in this unfolding 
phenomenon.  These are naturally occurring events that are uncomfortable, unavoidable, perhaps polit-
ical, but we would argue, essential to success.     
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